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CONSENT DECREES AND THE RIGHTS 
OF THIRD PARTIES 
Larry Kramer* 
Until recently, consent decrees were thought of primarily as part of 
antitrust law. But settlement by consent decree has lately become 
common in other public law areas: environmental cases, prison cases, 
school and housing desegregation cases, and especially employment 
discrimination cases.1 This, in turn, has generated a great deal of new 
commentary about consent decrees. Since one of the outstanding 
characteristics of public law litigation is its tendency to affect individu-
als and groups who are not parties to the litigation,2 a large part of this 
burgeoning literature concerns the effects of consent decrees on third 
parties.3 
The problem can be illustrated with a simple hypothetical. A 
plaintiff representing minority interests sues an employer for unlawful 
discrimination in hiring and promotions. Rather than litigate, the em-
ployer finds it cheaper and easier to settle, granting the plaintiff con-
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1. See Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environ-
mental Policy Making, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 328 & n.5; Schwarzschild, Public Law by 
Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 888. , 
2. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1979). 
3. See, e.g., Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third 
Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103; Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of 
Intervention: A Judicial Pincers Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 155; Epstein, 
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Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employment 
Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163; Comment, Co/lat-
eral Attacks on Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (1986) 
[hereinafter Comment, Collateral Attacks]; Comment, The Automobile Pollution Case: Interven-
tion in Consent Decree Settlement, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 408 (1970). See also Mengler, 
Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REv. 291, 337-42 (1988); Eas-
terbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 30-41. 
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cessions in the form of affirmative action. This gives the plaintiff what 
he wants, but at the expense of nonminority employees who are not 
represented in the litigation. These employees believe that the affirma-
tive action plan violates their rights under Title VII. If the settlement 
has been entered as a consent decree, what can they do about it? 
Such situations are ubiquitous: they arise anytime A and B find it 
easier to reach a mutually beneficial settlement by sacrificing the inter-
ests of C, who is unrepresented in the litigation.4 If A and B agree to 
an ordinary settlement, C's recourse is to bring an action alleging that 
the settlement, which is an ordinary contract, violates his rights. If A 
and B enter their settlement as a consent decree, however, C has a 
different set of options. 
In some ways, C is better off with a consent decree than with an 
ordinary settlement. The court will hold a "fairness hearing" before 
entering a consent decree to consider whether the settlement is "fair, 
adequate, and reasonable" to C,· although the court will not consider 
the merits of legal claims at this hearing, it may ask the parties to 
revise the agreement to make its effects on C less harsh. 5 In other 
ways, however; C is worse off. Most importantly, if C brings an in-
dependent action alleging that the settlement violates his rights, it will 
be dismissed as an "impermissible collateral attack."6 Under this so-
called "collateral attack bar," C must intervene in the consent decree 
proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. If intervention 
is denied, C will be stuck with a disadvantageous and possibly unlaw-
ful arrangement that he had no say in making. If intervention is 
granted, on the other hand, at least some courts assume that in addi-
tion to raising claims that the settlement violates his rights, C can 
force an adjudication of A's claim against B. 7 
This peculiar set of rules has received mixed reviews in the litera-
4. Additional illustrations are easy to find. For example, in Harrisburg Chapter of ACLU v. 
Scanlon, 500 Pa. 549, 458 A.2d 1352 (1983), the plaintiff brought an action against school offi-
cials alleging an establishment of religion by allowing student prayer groups to meet on campus; 
the defendants settled by agreeing not to allow these groups to meet on campus in the future. In 
Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), ajfd., 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988), the 
City of New York was sued for discriminating on the basis of race in placing children in foster 
homes and residential care facilities. This discrimination allegedly resulted from the City's coop-
erative arrangement with private Jewish and Catholic agencies which gave preferential treatment 
to co-religionists, who were predominantly white. The City settled by agreeing to withhold 
money from the religious agencies, which were dependent on these funds, unless they ceased this 
practice. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 103-10. 
5. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
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ture. Commentators generally approve of fairness hearings, 8 though 
some contend that these do not provide much protection.9 Most of the 
attention has been on the collateral attack bar, which everyone agrees 
is both undesirable and unconstitutional. 10 There is less agreement on 
what to do about it: Assistant Attorney General Cooper proposes that 
courts simply abolish this bar and allow third parties to maintain sepa-
rate actions attacking a consent decree. 11 Professor Laycock advances 
a more dramatic solution. He proposes that courts refuse to enter a 
consent decree that affects the "arguable rights" of some known or 
foreseeable third party unless the litigating parties join the third party 
as a defendant and either submit an agreement that the third party has 
approved or prove that the third party has no rights in the matter.12 
Other .commentators have offered more modest alternatives, such as 
eliminating the timeliness requirement for intervention in the context 
of third-party attacks on a consent decree, 13 or broadening the rights 
of parties to litigate jus tertii. 14 
What is missing from these accounts is a well-developed concep-
tion of what a consent decree is and why it should be treated specially. 
Such a conception is necessary to determine what rights third parties 
should have to attack a consent decree that affects their interests. Ac-
cordingly, I begin in Part I by describing the dynamics of the consent 
decree process: why parties want consent decrees and why courts 
agree to enforce them. On the basis of this description, I construct a 
model of the consent decree as a device that encourages settlement by 
facilitating enforcement of the parties' agreement. 
The remainder of the article then applies this model to third-party 
claims. Part II considers whether there is any reason to prevent third 
parties from bringing an independent action attacking a consent de-
cree. Part II concludes that the collateral attack bar is a form of ab-
stention, serving interests of comity and judicial economy by 
channeling third-party attacks to the court that entered the consent 
decree. However, requiring mandatory intervention shortens the time 
third parties have to seek relief. Because courts lack authority to mod-
8. See, e.g., Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 929-30; Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 210-
24; Comment, Consent Decrees and the Judicial Function, 20 CATII. U. L. REv. 312, 327 (1970). 
9. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 137-39; Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
43, 93-96. 
10. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 3; Cooper, supra note 3; Comment, Collateral Attacks, 
supra note 3; Mengler, supra note 3, at 319. 
11. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 176. 
12. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 128-29. 
13. See Comment, Collateral Attacks, supra note 3, at 173. 
14. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 228-31. 
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ify substantive rights, I suggest replacing the collateral attack bar with 
a simpler procedure of consolidating third-party claims and consent 
decree proceedings. Part III then addresses the distinct issue of 
whether the collateral attack bar is constitutional. I discuss this issue 
despite the conclusion in Part II because the Supreme Court has 
agreed to hear a case presenting it this Term, 15 and because, unlike 
other commentators, I believe that, properly applied, the collateral at-
tack bar is constitutional. The remainder of the article then fleshes out 
the details of third-party challenges to the legality of a consent decree. 
Part IV discusses the substantive claims that third parties can raise 
and the form of the remedy if they are successful. Part V addresses 
the need for fairness hearings and concludes that such hearings should 
not be required. The result is a comprehensive description of how 
third-party rights should be protected in the context of consent 
decrees. 
I. THE NATURE OF CONSENT DECREES 
What exactly is a consent decree? Opinions have varied over the 
years, and there is still no consensus.16 One view is that a consent 
decree is merely a private contract between the parties. 17 Another 
view treats a consent decree as a judgment of the court. 18 The domi-
nant modern view is that a consent decree is a hybrid, with elements of 
both contract and judgment.19 This view requires the court to decide 
whether a particular problem implicates the contract or judgment as-
pect of a consent decree; once the proper category is identified, the 
rules applicable to that category are applied.20 
But a consent decree is neither a contract nor a judgment - and it 
15. Martin v. Wilks, cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988). 
16. Mengler, supra note 3; Resnik, supra note 9, at 54-56. 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971); South v. Rowe, 
759 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1985); 3 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 1350, at 2773 (5th ed. 1925); Easterbrook, supra note 3. 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932); Railway Employees v. 
Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650-52 (1961); IB J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE~ 0.409[5], at 330-31 (1984); Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 u. CHI. LEGAL F. 
1, 3, 12. 
19. See, e.g., Local 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 
(1986); United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 & n.10 (1975); United 
States v. American Cyanimid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 563 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 
(1984); Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 894-95. 
20. See, e.g., Ho v. Martin Marietta Corp., 845 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1988); Dunn v. Carey, 
808 F.2d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1559 & n.6 
(5th Cir. 1984); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 561 (6th Cir. 1982), revd. on other 
grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); V.T.A., Inc. v. 
Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224, 226 (10th Cir. 1979). 
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is both. This whole way of thinking about consent decrees is im-
proper, for it leads courts to focus on outer appearance rather than 
underlying purpose. A consent decree is what it is: an agreement be-
tween the parties to end a lawsuit on mutually acceptable terms which 
the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment. What is critical is why the 
parties want judicial assistance and why the court agrees (or should 
agree) to provide it. If contract or judgment rules apply to consent 
decrees, it is because the nature of the parties' agreement or the reason 
for judicial assistance is such that the justification for a particular con-
tract or judgment rule also makes sense for consent decrees. But the 
fact that consent decrees often resemble contracts or judgments does 
not mean that this will always be the case. There may be instances in 
which the appropriate rule for a consent decree is different from both 
contract and judgment rules. 
In order to understand consent decrees properly, then, we need a 
fuller appreciation of the dynamics of the consent decree process: 
Why do parties want consent decrees? Why should courts agree to 
enforce them?21 
One party files a lawsuit against another. Rather than spend time 
and money and still risk losing at trial, the parties will usually negoti-
ate a settlement. Negotiating a settlement is like negotiating any 
agreement against a background of uncertainty. If the plaintiff's mini-
mum offer is less than the defendant's maximum offer, and if excessive 
second-guessing does not cause the bargaining process to falter, an 
agreement will be reached and the case will be voluntarily dismissed. 
In this, the typical settlement, there is no further judicial involve-
ment. The agreement by which the plaintiff agrees to dismiss his law-
suit is an ordinary contract, and it can be enforced, modified or set 
aside as such. 
Sometimes, however, the parties ask the court to enter their settle-
ment as a decree. This has some rather important consequences. If 
either party fails to live up to the agreement, the other party can ob-
tain contempt sanctions without having to file an independent lawsuit 
on the contract. This allows the party seeking enforcement to avoid 
some of the expense of a separate lawsuit. Perhaps more importantly, 
it enables the party seeking enforcement to avoid the court's docket 
queue and obtain sanctions more quickly than if a new lawsuit had to 
be filed. In addition, if the settlement is entered as a decree, the court 
may provide additional assistance (like appointing a monitor to over-
21. A similar account of this process is given by Mengler, supra note 3. 
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see implementation) and will interpret the decree to help the parties 
resolve disputes before they reach the point of formal litigation. 
It is easy, in light of these benefits, to see why a plaintiff might 
prefer a consent decree to a private contract. By speeding up the pro-
cess and lowering the cost of enforcement, consent decrees enhance 
the plaintiff's ability to hold the defendant to his bargain. ·Indeed, the 
benefits of a consent decree are often indispensable to plaintiffs in pub-
lic law or institutional reform litigation.22 The plaintiffs in these cases 
are frequently short on resources; they are typically represented by pro 
bono counsel or by counsel financed through government legal aid; 
often the class is unorganized and each ~ember has only a small stake 
in the outcome. In addition, settlements providing for the installation 
of pollution control devices, the implementation of affirmative action, 
or the construction of new facilities to house prisoners 01 mental 
health patients can be extremely complicated. The parties often antici-
pate taking years to fulfill the agreement. Moreover, as the agreement 
grows more complex, it becomes increasingly likely that there will be 
disputes over its interpretation. Consequently, the availability of a 
consent decree may make a significant difference in the willingness of 
the plaintiff to settle.23 
The defendant's reasons for agreeing to a consent decree are some-
what different. Except in rare instances, the plaintiff's side of the bar-
gain is simply to drop the lawsuit, and the defendant does not need a 
device to facilitate enforcement. Indeed, if anything, such devices are 
to the defendant's disadvantage. But the reduced expense of resolving 
22. See Neubome & Schwarz, A Prelude to the Settlement a/Wilder, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
177. 
23. A few commentators have suggested that plaintiffs favor consent decrees because these 
may provide broader relief than would be available after a trial. See, e.g., Flynn, Consent Decrees 
in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53 IOWA L. REV. 983, 1003 (1968); 
Note, The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 63 HARV. L. REV. 320 (1949). But this 
only explains why the parties might choose a consent decree over litigation. Parties cannot do 
more if they settle by consent decree than they could do if they settle by private contract. See 
Local 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515-18, 529-30 (1986) (an 
affirmative action plan in a consent decree could not exceed the limits established for a "purely 
private contractual agreement" in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). The 
argument about broader relief thus does not explain why a plaintiff might prefer a consent decree 
to a private contract. 
There is one rather important exception to the rule that parties cannot do more substantively 
in a consent decree than they could do in an ordinary settlement: limitations on the extent to 
which one government administration can bind its successors by contract are not applied if the 
contract is entered as a consent decree. See Shane, Federal Policymaking by Consent Decree: An 
Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241; McConnell, Why Hold 
Elections? Using Consent Decrees To Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. Cm. 
LEGAL F. 295. Other commentators have criticized allowing consent decrees to bind subsequent 
administrations. See id.; Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 30-41. Their criticisms are consistent with 
the approach to consent decrees discussed here insofar as they suggest that there is no justifica-
tion for giving consent decrees greater effect than contracts. 
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disputes in the implementation phase is advantageous to the defendant 
as well as the plaintiff. Moreover, it is generally easier to obtain modi-
fication of a consent decree than a contract if circumstances change.24 
Most importantly, if the plaintiff wants a consent decree badly enough, 
the defendant can obtain additional bargaining concessions in return. 
But why should the court enter a consent decree? The answer, 
already suggested by the analysis above, is that making consent de-
crees available facilitates the settlement of difficult cases that might 
otherwise go to trial, furthering the strongly held policy favoring set-
tlement over litigation. The reasons for this policy are well known.25 
Settlement is more efficient for the. parties, giving them more of what 
they hoped to gain at less cost. More importantly, settlement allows 
already overburdened judges to devote time to cases that are not set-
tled voluntarily. 
The chief difficulty with this justification is that there is no assur-
ance that consent decrees do in fact facilitate settlement and conserve 
judicial resources.26 Judith Resnik recently pointed to the dearth of 
empirical support for the assertion that cases settled by consent decree 
would not have settled otherwise.27 She also observed that entering a 
consent decree is not costless.28 The court must interpret the agree-
24. See Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal 
Courts, 64 TEXAS L. REv. 1101 (1986); Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Struc-
tural Refonn Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725, 752-57. 
25. See w. BRAZIL, SETrLING CIVIL SUITS (1985); Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 21-30; 
Mengler, supra note 3, at 327-32; Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 
29 VILL. L. REv. 1363 (1983-1984); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis 
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STuo. 55 (1982). 
26. Owen Fiss challenges the policy favoring settlement on the ground that there is more 
"justice" in litigation. See Fiss, supra note 18; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 
(1984). His position, which has been criticized elsewhere, see Easterbrook, supra note 3, stands 
in contrast to the overwhelming consensus among courts and lawmakers. The policy favoring 
settlement has been recognized - and acted upon - by both the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Evans 
v. JeffD., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Carson v. American Brands, 
Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 86-90 (1981), and numerous lower courts, see, e.g., Stotts v. Memphis Fire 
Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 555 (1982), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union 1784 
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1362 (5th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 846-49 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 
771 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 129-2, 
1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd., 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988). The purpose of Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is to encourage settlements, and a primary reason for the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 16 was to enhance the power of the federal judiciary to facilitate settlements. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 excludes evidence of settlement offers and statements made while 
negotiating settlements in order to promote "the public policy favoring the compromise and 
settlement of disputes." FED. R. Evm. 408 advisory committee's note. Given the present judici-
ary and its caseload, the policy favoring settlement is indispensable - a point even sympathizers 
of Professor Fiss have been willing to concede. See Sarokin. Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 
RUTGERS L. REv. 431, 433-34 (1986). 
27. Resnik, supra note 9, at 67-69. 
28. Id. at 69-85. 
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ment if the parties seek judicial assistance before litigation and adjudi-
cate disputes that remain unresolved. Thus, even if some cases are 
settled only because the parties obtain a consent decree, we still do not 
know that this results in a net savings of judicial resources. 
Professor Resnik is correct that little empirical evidence demon-
strates the net benefits of consent decrees. On the other hand, there is 
no empirical evidence that consent decrees do not produce such bene-
fits. Until such evidence is produced, the better assumption seems to 
be that consent decrees are worth the effort needed to enforce them. 
This assumption is supported by the analysis above, which suggests 
that consent decrees are probably indispens~ble in settling at least 
some cases. And it is generally agreed that the fact that consent de-
crees are negotiated voluntarily but can be enforced by contempt sanc-
tions makes them the most effective - and cheapest - way to 
implement a remedial plan. 29 Even Professor Resn\k concedes that 
"there is some intuitive appeal to believing that consent decrees have 
. . . more persuasive force than court decrees imposed after adjudica-
tion .... "3° Finally, both these points and the conclusion that consent 
decrees are an efficient allocation of judicial resources are supported 
by judicial experience and by what limited evidence we do have.31 
This description of the consent decree process provides a basis for 
thinking about how to administer consent decrees. Given a choice be-
tween alternative rules, a court should first consider which alternative 
better facilitates voluntary settlement. This is where (and why) con-
tract law is often useful, since it is generally designed to enable parties 
to reach binding agreements. 
For example, a consent decree is interpreted like a contract.32 Ac-
29. See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane) 
(Rubin, J., concurring); United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1152, n.9 (5th Cir. 
1975); Anderson, supra note 24, at 748-52; McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims 
Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Socv. REV. 11, 47 (1984); Note, 
Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 
1811, 1830 (1986). 
30. Resnik, supra note 9, at 70. 
31. See Neubome & Schwarz, supra note 22, at 180-81; Anderson, supra note 24 (case study 
of three consent decrees); McEwen & Maiman, supra note 29. Congress examined the Depart-
ment of Justice's use of consent decrees in antitrust cases in the late 1950s and again in the early 
1970s. See ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 86TH CONG., lST SESS., 
REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Comm. 
Print 1959); H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6535. Although Congress eventually decided to regulate the negotiating p·ocess, 
see Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982), there was 
general agreement that consent decrees were a cost-effective device for obtaining settlements. 
32. See South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 557 
(6th Cir. 1981); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 Col.UM. L. REV. 1, 22-24 
(1972). 
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cording to the Supreme Court, this is because a consent decree is nego-
tiated like a contract.33 But the terms of an ordinary judgment are 
often negotiated by the parties after liability has been determined 
through litigation, 34 and the Court has never suggested that a litigated 
decree should be interpreted like a contract. Rather, the reason it 
makes sense to interpret a consent decree like a contract is that a con-
sent decree represents only what the parties have agreed to do, and the 
court's participation in enforcing the decree is simply a means of en-
couraging the parties to make such agreements. The policy protecting 
justified party expectations that underlies contract law is thus fully 
applicable. With a litigated decree, by contrast, judicial participation 
is compelled by one party's invocation of right under substantive law. 
The court must therefore interpret the decree in light of what the sub-
stantive law requires to remedy a proven violation. 
But contract law will not always be appropriate for consent de-
crees, and the court's participation may sometimes require the devel-
opment of special procedures. For instance, in Local 93, International 
Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 35 the Supreme Court 
held that a court cannot approve a consent decree unless it (1) deter-
mines that the consent decree "spring[s] from and serve[s] to resolve a 
dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction"; (2) ensures that 
the consent decree comes " 'within the general scope of the case made 
by the pleadings' "; and (3) satisfies itself that the consent decree "fur-
ther[s] the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was 
based."36 The exact reason for these requirements has puzzled some 
commentators, 37 but they follow naturally from an understanding of 
consent decrees as a method of facilitating settlement by making judi-
cial resources available, under certain circumstances, to help the par-
ties enforce their agreement. The court is not "a recorder of 
contracts" from whom parties can freely purchase injunctions. 38 The 
court only agrees to "record" and enforce a particular kind of con-
tract: one that saves judicial resources by settling a lawsuit. The re-
33. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971); United States v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 (1975). 
34. See Jost, supra note 24, at 1103; Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional 
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 653-54 (1982); Diver, The Judge as Polit-
ical Power Broker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 
82-83 (1979). 
35. 478 U.S. 501 (1986). 
36. 478 U.S. 525 (quoting Pacific R.R. Co. v. Ketchum, IOI U.S. 289, 297 (1880)). 
37. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 9, at 59, 83-84. 
38. IB J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, supra note 18, ~ 0.409[5]. See also System Fedn. 
No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961) ("parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, 
purchase from a court of equity a continuing injunction"). 
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quirements for approval set forth in Local 93 help insure that only 
such contracts are entered as consent decrees. 39 
Moreover, the court is concerned with other interests in addition 
to facilitating settlement, and the pursuit or protection of these inter-
ests may impose limits on the consent decree device. Consider, for 
example, the question of modifying a consent decree over the objection 
of one of the parties. One might extend the argument for interpreting 
consent decrees according to principles of contract law to modifica-
tion. But the Supreme Court held contract law inapplicable to consent 
decree modification in United States v. Swift & Co. 40 The Court ex-
plained that a consent decree is a "judicial act,"41 an unsatisfying ex-
planation made even more so by the fact that the Court articulated a 
test for modifying a consent decree that is stricter than the test for 
modifying judgments entered after litigation. 42 How, then, does one 
explain the rules governing consent decree modification? 
An argument can be made that entering the parties' agreement as a 
judgment associates the court with a consent decree in a way that is 
not true of ordinary contracts.43 This, in tum, gives the court an insti-
tutional stake in the consent decree beyond protecting the parties' ex-
pectations, and justifies retaining additional power to modify the 
decree if, in the words of Justice Cardozo, the court is "satisfied that 
what it has been doing has been turned through changing circum-
stances into an instrument of wrong."44 
The hard question is deciding how broad this power should be. 
The Swift Court apparently thought that a narrow power would suf-
fice. 45 Courts today are often willing to modify consent decrees on a 
less stringent showing.46 I do not address this issue here. My point is 
39. These requirements obviously measure the need for a consent decree imperfectly. The 
court has discretion to refuse to enter a proposed consent decree, Kasper v. Board of Election 
Commrs., 814 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987); Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 212, and judges 
could - and perhaps should - refuse to enter a consent decree when there is no genuine dispute 
or when resolving a dispute does not require assistance from the court. 
40. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
41. 286 U.S. at 115. 
42. See Jost, supra note 24, at 1111; Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institu-
tional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1022-26 (1986). 
43. Mengler, supra note 3, at 320; Rotunda, The Public Interest Appellant: Limitations on the 
Right of Competent Parties to Settle Litigation Out of Court, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 199, 223-24 
(1971). 
44. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 114-15. 
45. The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers, once substan-
tial, have become attenuated to a shadow .... Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous 
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed 
after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned. 
286 U.S. at 119. 
46. See, e.g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 968-70 
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simply to illustrate that beyond the question of whether a particular 
rule facilitates settlement lies the additional question of whether fur-
ther adjustments are necessary because of the court's involvement in 
the enforcement process. 
II. THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS To CHALLENGE CONSENT DECREES 
What implications does this model of the consent decree process 
have for rules governing third-party attacks on a consent decree? Re-
call the hypothetical case described in the introduction: A plaintiff 
representing minority interests (AJ sues an employer (BJ for employ-
ment discrimination, and they settle. A drops the lawsuit in exchange 
for B's agreement to implement affirmative action. The judge enters 
this settlement as a consent decree. Nonminority employees (CJ learn 
of the consent decree and conclude that what B has agreed to do vio-
lates their rights under Title VII. What can C do? 
Given the analysis in Part I, the answer would seem to be that C 
can file a lawsuit to enjoin B from violating C's rights - just as C 
could have done if the contract between A and B had not been entered 
as a consent decree. The court's willingness to enter the contract as a 
judgment to encourage A and B to settle says nothing about any rights 
C may have. And the court's stake in protecting the agreement from 
attack (or, if illegal, from being undone) is no greater than if the settle-
ment had been by private contract and C was now attacking the con-
tract in court. 
Nonetheless, most courts will dismiss C's separate action challeng-
ing a consent decree and advise C to seek relief from the court that 
entered the decree by becoming a party to that proceeding.47 As noted 
(2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983) (Friendly, J.) ("[A] consensus is emerging 
among commentators in favor of modification [of consent decrees] with a rather free hand."); 
United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1359-60 (7th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Jost, supra 
note 24, at 1113-20. 
47. See, e.g., Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), ajfd. by an equally divided Court, 
108 S. Ct. 586 (1988); Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 
1021 (1986); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. i982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 900 
(1983); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1982), revd. on other 
grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Society Hill Civic 
Assn. v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1050-51 (3d Cir. 1980); Black & White Children v. School Dist., 
464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), ajfd. 
without opinion, 573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978); McAleer v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435, 438 (D.D.C. 1976); O'burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549 
(E.D. Pa. 1976), ajfd without opinion, 546 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 
(1977). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits initially endorsed the cqllateral attack bar, but recent 
statements suggest that they may not adhere to this position. Compare Burns v. Board of School 
Commrs., 437 F.2d 1143, 1144 (7th Cir. 1971), and Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of 
Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1981), with Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 558-60 
(7th Cir. 1986), and County of Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied. lOi S. Ct. 1605 (1987). Only the Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the bar. See In 
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in the introduction, this doctrine is called the "collateral attack bar." 
The name is somewhat inapt because "collateral attack" ordinarily re-
fers to a party's attempt to avoid a judgment rendered against that 
party in a different action. Since C was not a party to the action be-
tween A and B, it is strange to think of C's lawsuit against B as a 
"collateral attack": no judgment was ever rendered against C. Hav-
ing said that, I will conform to practice and use the label. 
The collateral attack bar does not apply to every claim that C has 
against B, or even to every claim that is related to the dispute settled in 
the consent decree. It is limited to claims that (1) seek to enjoin the 
implementation of a consent decree (2) on the ground that the decree 
requires B to take action that violates C's rights.48 Thus, it does not 
bar an independent action alleging that a consent decree breached 
prior contractual rights of C if the remedy sought is damages.49 
The collateral attack bar affects C in two distinct ways. First, it 
limits C's choice of forum: C is allowed to seek relief only in the pro-
ceeding in which the consent decree was entered. Second, it shortens 
the time C has to bring his claim. This is because courts require C to 
join the consent decree proceeding by intervening. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 24 requires that a motion to intervene be "timely," 
and in practice Rule 24's time limit is invariably shorter than the ap-
plicable statute of limitations. 
A justification for the collateral attack bar is not immediately ap-
parent. Unless precluded by res judicata, a party can ordinarily have 
his claim adjudicated by any court with jurisdiction. Since C was -
by hypothesis - not a party to the lawsuit that was settled by the 
consent decree nor in privity with a party to that lawsuit, C's claims 
are not barred by res judicata. C therefore ought to be able to sue in 
any court with jurisdiction. Had A and B settled their lawsuit with an 
ordinary contract, C's right to sue would not be limited. Why should 
the result be different simply because the court agreed to enter that 
contract as a judgment? 
Courts that enforce the collateral attack bar have answered in two 
ways. First, they note that the threat of subsequent third-party at-
tacks discourages parties from agreeing to settle. 50 Second, they point 
re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 
1987), cerL granted sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); United States v. Jefferson 
County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th Cir. 1983). 
48. See Highland Petroleum, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Energy, 798 F.2d 474, 477-80 
(femp. Erner. Ct. App. 1986). 
49. E.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union No. 759, Intl. Union of United Rubber Workers, 
461 U.S. 757 (1983). 
50. See, e.g., In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 
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out that adjudicating a lawsuit that attacks the provisions of a consent 
decree duplicates work already done by the court that entered the de-
cree, and creates a risk of inconsistent or conflicting injunctions from 
different courts.51 
The argument that separate third-party lawsuits should be barred 
because they discourage settlement is consistent with the justification 
for consent decrees discussed in Part I. From this perspective, the 
collateral attack bar is a procedural rule that furthers the goal of facili-
tating settlement. But one can have too much of a good thing. Settle-
ment is not the ultimate end of the legal process; the ultimate end is 
the just disposition of parties' claims. Settlement is merely a means to 
this end. It may be a preferred means because it is fast and inexpen-
sive, and to this extent facilitating settlement may justify some limita-
tions on parties' rights. 52 But it would be an obvious distortion of the 
legal process to say that the claims of some parties should be forfeit in 
order to make it easier for other parties to settle. It is no less a distor-
tion to make it harder for some parties to obtain a hearing solely to 
achieve this end. Without a reason to prefer the claims of the parties 
who settle to the claims of third parties affected by the settlement, the 
collateral attack bar cannot be justified on the ground that it discour-
ages third-party claims. 
The argument that separate third-party lawsuits should be barred 
to prevent duplication of effort and conflicting judgments fares better. 
The judge who entered a consent decree is familiar with the dispute, 
and it is obviously desirable to take advantage of this familiarity by 
bringing related disputes before the same judge.53 More importantly, 
a successful third-party attack will necessarily result in conflicting in-
junctions, since the judgment in the second action will enjoin compli-
ance with the consent decree. B must then seek to have the consent 
decree modified. But the judge who entered the consent decree may 
1498 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); Schwarz-
schild, supra note 1, at 919, 922-23; Comment, Collateral Attacks, supra note 3, at 168-72. 
51. See, e.g., Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), ajfd. by an equally divided 
Court, 108 S. Ct. 586 (1988); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1982). 
52. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 68 to include attorney's fees as part of "costs" in order to facilitate settlement). 
53. The common wisdom used to be that judges enter consent decrees with little or no in-
quiry into the substance of the dispute. See, e.g., Donovan & McAllister, Consent Decrees in the 
Enforcement of Federal Anti-trust Laws, 46 HARV. L. R.Ev. 885, 914-15 (1933); Note, The Con-
sent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1316 
(1959). Statements to this effect are still found in the secondary literature, but rubber-stamping 
is in fact much less common. While the degree of participation probably varies from judge to 
judge, most judges participate to some extent in the negotiation and entry of a consent decree 
settlement. Resnik, supra note 9, at 60. This is consistent with the general trend in the federal 
courts toward increased judicial management. 
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disagree with the ruling in the second case or may think that the rem-
edy ordered there was excessive. That judge may refuse to modify the 
consent decree, leaving B to seek modification of the litigated decree. 
If neither judge ends the tennis match, B will be subject to conflicting 
obligations under the threat of contempt froni two courts. 
We could just ignore this possibility on the theory that parties 
should sleep in the beds they make for themselves. But that is hardly a 
desirable solution from the standpoint of either comity or judicial 
economy. The collateral attack bar avoids these problems by channel-
ing related claims into the same court. We get one judgment from one 
judge applicable to all concerned parties. We save time and effort and 
avoid the tricky jurisdictional and comity issues raised by competing 
injunctions. 54 
The bar on third-party collateral attacks thus turns out to be an 
abstention doctrine: one court dismisses an action in favor of the con-
current jurisdiction of another court that is deemed to provide a more 
appropriate forum. 55 Explaining the justification for the collateral at-
tack bar exposes what is wrong with it. As noted above, the collateral 
attack bar disadvantages third parties in two ways: it limits their 
choice of forum, and it shortens the time within which they must seek 
relief. But, this account of the bar only justifies remitting third parties 
to the consent decree proceeding. It does not justify requiring them to 
seek relief sooner than they would have to otherwise. 
It might be possible to defend the collateral attack bar by arguing 
that its benefits are great enough to justify imposing this additional 
burden on third parties. But courts lack the competence to make this 
judgment. The assessment of costs and benefits necessary to make this 
defense depends on factual data that are not available to courts decid-
ing cases: How much are third parties disadvantaged by this bar? 
How costly is the duplication of effort and how likely is it that courts 
will issue conflicting judgments without the collateral attack bar? 
Moreover, the judgment that must be made requires a choice between 
incommensurate values: the benefits to the judicial system in terms of 
comity and economy versus the costs to third parties from having to 
take legal action more quickly. 
In addition to lacking competence, courts also lack authority to 
create the collateral attack bar. Courts can modify procedural rights 
54. This explains why the collateral attack bar does not extend to suits seeking damages, 
since an award of damages will not create these problems. See supra note 49 and accompanying 
text. 
55. An appropriate analogy could also be drawn to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
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and require parties to bring their claims in a particular forum or pro-
ceeding - all abstention doctrines have this effect. But the collateral 
attack bar modifies the substantive rights of third parties by supersed-
ing the ordinarily applicable limitations period with Rule 24's timeli-
ness requirement. 56 As such, it exceeds the courts' narrow authority 
to fashion abstention doctrines. 57 Whether the goal of facilitating set-
tlement is important enough to justify altering otherwise applicable 
limitations periods is a decision that must be made by Congress. 58 
These criticisms of the collateral attack bar are limited to the fact 
that it shortens the time third parties have to seek relief. But the 
courts that developed the collateral attack bar simply assumed that 
intervention is the only way third parties can join the consent decree 
proceeding. There is another way, however, one that does not suffer 
from this defect: transfer a third party's case to the district in which 
the consent decree was entered (if transfer is necessary59) and consoli-
date it with the consent decree proceedings. This will channel the 
third party's action to the appropriate court without affecting that 
party's substantive rights. 
The option to transfer and consolidate third-party claims is avail-
able throughout the life of the decree. Most consent decrees include 
express retention of jurisdiction clauses empowering the court to hear 
all disputes concerning the decree as long as it continues in effect. 60 
But courts retain jurisdiction to modify or terminate a consent decree 
even without such a clause. 61 
Transfer can be effected pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which 
permits the court to transfer a case "[f]or the convenience of parties 
and witnesses, in the interest of justice." Alternatively, a third-party 
challenge can be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which provides 
56. The right modified depends on the nature of the third party's claim. For example, if an 
employment discrimination claim is based on Title VII, the collateral attack bar modifies the 
period established in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982), which permits a charge to be filed within a 
given number of days (usually 180) after the employer takes specific action that affects the plain-
tiff (not after the employer agrees with someone else in a consent decree to take such action). If 
the claim was against a government employer under the fourteenth amendment, the collateral 
attack bar would alter the limitations period applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). 
57. See Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2679 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Redish, 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). 
58. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (rules of civil procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right"). While abstention doctrines are treated as interpretations of stat-
utes conferring jurisdiction rather than as applications of the rules of civil procedure, the senti-
ment expressed by this limitation is applicable. 
59. Most third-party claims are filed in ~he district where the consent decree was entered 
simply because most controversies are local. 
60. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 736. 
61. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932); Sarabia v. Toledo Police 
Patrolman's Assn., 601 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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that whenever the court finds that "there is a want of jurisdiction" -
the usual result of abstaining under the collateral attack bar - the 
court "shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or 
appeal to any other such court in which the action ... could have been 
brought .... " Consolidation is then permitted under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 42 "[w]hen actions involving a common question of 
law or fact are pending before the court." 
Ordinarily, the decision to transfer or consolidate a case rests in 
the discretion of the trial judge. 62 But if the alternative is to dismiss 
on the ground that the case should be heard in a different forum, fail-
ure to exercise that discretion should be deemed an abuse. Courts can 
abstain from hearing separate third-party actions in order to channel 
these actions to the consent decree proceedings in the interests of com-
ity and judicial economy. In doing so, however, they must utilize pro-
cedures like the provisions for transfer and consolidation that preserve 
the substantive rights of third parties. 
This simple alternative to the collateral attack bar seems so obvi-
ous that it is surprising that it has been overlooked. 63 Perhaps the 
answer is, as Professor Laycock and Assistant Attorney General 
Cooper evidently believe, that the real agenda behind the collateral 
attack doctrine is to enable some parties to settle by bargaining away 
third-party interests. 64 In any event, the collateral attack bar should 
be invalidated because the legitimate purposes it serves can be fully 
vindicated in a way that does not affect the substantive rights of third 
parties. 
Federal Rule of Civil Prbcedure 19 provides another alternative to 
the collateral attack bar. Under Rule 19, the defendant can compel 
joinder of any party who 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incur-
ring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 
his claimed interest.65 
62. Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1988); Manuli, 
U.S.A. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 244, 247 (Ct. Intl. Trade 1987); Comptroller of the Cur-
rency v. Calhoun First Natl. Bank, 626 F. Supp. 137, 140 n.10 (D.D.C. 1985). 
63. The court in Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 916-17 (3d Cir. 1978), 
noted that a district court transferred two civil actions challenging the validity of a consent 
decree to the district where the consent decree was entered, and the cases were assigned to the 
judge who had heard the original case (although they were not consolidated). Neither the Third 
Circuit nor any other court has recognized the significance of this solution or adopted it as 
· standard practice. No commentator has even mentioned this option. 
04. See Laycock, supra note 3; Cooper, supra note 3 . 
. 65. FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2). 
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Although this right is generally treated as a defense that can be waived 
by the parties, 66 there is a narrow category of cases (involving what 
used to be called indispensable parties) in which courts will order join-
der sua sponte. 67 This category could be expanded ·to include consent 
decree cases, making the duty to join third parties mandatory and 
eliminating the need for a bar on independent third-party claims. 68 
This alternative is inferior to a consolidation procedure for several 
reasons. First, it requires the court to identify which third parties 
need to be joined, a task that turns out to be rather difficult. 69 As 
Professor Laycock- who advocates a Rule 19 approach- admits, 
[t]he effects of a consent decree may ripple outward, with smaller and 
smaller effects on more and more people, many of whom cannot feasibly 
be joined. Injunctive litigation could rarely proceed if it were necessary 
to join every third party who might be affected. [It is necessary to de-
velop] criteria for identifying those third parties whose stake in the litiga-
tion is so great that no consent decree should be entered without their 
consent.70 
But Professor Laycock can do no better than to require the joinder of 
a third party "if it is foreseeable [that he] will be significantly affected 
by the proposed decree and that he has an arguable legal claim that he 
cannot be so affected."71 
Second, the court must make difficult choices with respect to who 
shall represent individuals who must be joined. In an employment dis-
crimination case, for example, it may be unclear whose interests a 
union can or should represent if it has members on both sides of the 
dispute. And if there is no union, or if the case involves applicants or 
employees who are not union members, how is the court to choose an 
appropriate class i;.epresentative? More importantly, how is the court 
to choose (and who is going to pay) the attorneys for such a class? 
Third, requiring joinder of all third parties who may be affected by 
a consent decree will probably n:sult in more litigation than eliminat-
ing the collateral attack bar and giving consent decrees no special ef-
fect whatever. There will almost certainly be third parties who do not 
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), (h)(2). 
67. See 3A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
~ 19.05(2], at 19-80 (1987); 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE§ 1609 (1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE]. 
68. A few commentators read Rule 19 already to impose such a duty. See, e.g., Laycock, 
supra note 3, at 130-31; Mengler, supra note 3, at 338-39; Comment, Collateral Attacks, supra 
note 3, at 164, 174-75. 
69. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 121-24; Comment, Collateral Attacks, supra note 3, at 175-
76. 
70. Laycock, supra note 3, at 121. 
71. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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care enough about the adverse effects of a consent decree to initiate 
litigation but who will litigate once they have been made parties to an 
ongoing lawsuit. There is no reason to encourage such litigation. 
Finally, while requiring joinder under Rule 19 assures that third-
party claims are heard, it does so in a way which - like the collateral 
attack bar - forces third parties to litigate sooner than they would 
have to otherwise. 
Consolidation, then, is a better way to secure the advantages of the 
collateral attack bar in terms of comity and judicial economy without 
unnecessarily disadvantaging third parties. Because the collateral at-
tack bar does make it harder for third parties to challenge a consent 
decree, however, this proposal may result in fewer successful settle-
ments by consent decrees. Indeed, Professor Laycock suggests that 
the parties will find a consent decree worthless if it cannot bind third 
parties, and that without the collateral attack bar, consent decrees will 
seldom be used. 72 This probably overstates the case. Litigants do not 
agree to settle by consent decree only to disadvantage third parties. 
As explained in Part I, many reasons for seeking a consent decree have 
nothing to do with third parties. 73 These reasons remain even without 
the collateral attack bar. But if removing unnecessary obstacles to the 
ability of third parties to protect their rights makes consent decrees 
less desirabl~ than they would be otherwise, so be it. As Judge Easter-
brook noted, "[i]f the 'attraction' of the decree comes from an unau-
thorized source, a diminution in its attractiveness is hardly 
objectionable. "74 
III. THE COLLATERAL ATTACK BAR AND DUE PROCESS 
0 
Suppose that Congress enacted a statute providing that third par-
ties could challenge a consent decree only by intervening in the con-
sent decree proceedings. Since Congress is competent to make the 
judgment that such a rule is desirable, this statute would not be subject 
to the infirmities discussed in Part II. But other commentators have 
objected to the collateral attack bar on the ground that it violates the 
due process clause. 75 Presumably, then, these commentators would 
invalidate the bar even if established by Congress. 
72. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 112, 117-20. 
73. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
74. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 38; Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 66 
{5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). 
75. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 3; Cooper, supra note 3; Comment, Collateral Attacks, 
supra note 3; Mengler,supra note 3, at 319;see also Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 901-
02 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certioran); In re Birmingham Reverse Dis-
crimination Employ. Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498-99 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. 
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Last Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the 
constitutionality of the collateral attack bar, but affirmed the judgment 
of the lower court by an equally divided Court. 76 The Court recently 
agreed to hear another case posing this issue. 77 Therefore, although I 
have already argued that the collateral attack bar should be abolished, 
I will discuss its constitutionality. Unlike other commentators, I con-
clude that the collateral attack bar does not violate the due process 
clause. 
A third party subject to the collateral attack bar must intervene in 
the consent decree proceedings under Federal Rule of .Civil Procedure 
24. Because an independent action is barred, the third party will be 
unable to obtain judicial relief if intervention is denied. It does not 
necessarily follow that due process has also been denied, for the due 
process clause does not guarantee every party with a claim the right 
ac~ually to litigate. If it did, compulsory counterclaim rules and stat-
utes of limitations would be unconstitutional. Due process requires 
only that every litigant have an opportunity to be heard. The question 
is whether the opportunity to intervene under Rule 24 satisfies this 
requirement. 
According to Rule 24(a)(2), a party has a right to intervene if 
(1) the party has "an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action," (2) the party is "so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
the applicant's ability to protect that interest," (3) intervention has 
been sought in a "timely" manner, and ( 4) the interest is not "ade-
quately represented by existing parties."78 As the discussion below ex-
plains, allowing a party to be heard on the merits only if he satisfies 
these requirements does not deprive that party of due process. 
A. Interest and Impairment 
The requirements that the prospective intervenor have an interest 
Martin v. Wilks, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1517-
19 (11th Cir. 1983). 
76. Marino v. Ortiz, 108 S. Ct. 586 (1988). 
77. Martin v. Wilks, cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988). The Court granted two related 
petitions at the same time. See 108 S. Ct. at 2843 (grant of certiorari in Personnel Bd. v. Wilks, 
No. 87-1639; and Arrington v. Wilks, No. 87-1668). 
78. I have reordered these requirements for ease of analysis. The actual language of FED. R. 
CIV. P. 24(a)(2) provides: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) 
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and [the applicant] is so situated that the disposition of the action may 
as a practical matter impair or impede [the applicant's] ability to protect that interest, unless 
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
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relating to the action and that his ability to protect this interest may be 
impaired are minimally restrictive. According to the Supreme Court, 
the "interest" must be "a significantly protectable" one. 79 Although 
the precise meaning of this concept is obscure, 80 it encompasses any 
interest that constitutes liberty or property under the due process 
clause or that could provide the basis for an independent action. 81 
There are cases suggesting that Rule 24 is satisfied by any interest suf-
ficient to confer standing under Article III. 82 
The requirement that the intervenor's ability to protect this inter-
est may be impaired is satisfied "whenever disposition of the present 
action would put the applicant at a practical disadvantage in protect-
ing his interest."83 Most courts hold that the possibility of prejudice 
due to stare decisis meets this requirement. 84 Other kinds of "practi-
cal" impairment are also sufficient, so long as the litigation could leave 
the applicant for intervention worse off in some way.85 
Given these definitions, it is not surprising that third parties sub-
ject to the collateral attack bar have experienced little difficulty in sat-
isfying the interest and impairment requirements. C alleges that the 
consent decree violates his legal rights - indeed, he would prefer to 
file a separate lawsuit. And C may argue that he will be unable to 
protect his rights if intervention is denied because the collateral attack 
bar precludes him from bringing this separate action. More important 
for the present discussion, it is clear that conditioning intervention on 
C's ability to satisfy these requirements does not violate due process 
79. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). 
80. See 7 c WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1908, at 270-88; 3 BJ. MOORE & J. 
KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 24.07(2], at 24-57 (1987). 
81. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 80, 1124.07(2], at 24-57. See, e.g., Triax Co. v. 
TRW, Inc., 724 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1984); Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1979). 
82. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Smuck v. 
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178-82 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en bane),· Shreve, Questioning Intervention of 
Right- Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 894, 906-07 (1980); 
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. 
REv. 721, 737-38 (1968). In Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986), the Supreme Court 
expressly refrained from addressing the relationship between the interest required to intervene 
and the interest required to confer standing. 
83. 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1908, at 302. 
84. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); New York Pub. 
Interest Group v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 516 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam),· Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United 
States, 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 1967); 3B i. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 80, 
11 24.07(3], at 24-65 & n.13 (citing cases). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1988); Ford Motor Co. 
v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22, 28 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 
408, 412 (D. Minn. 1972); Shreve, supra note 82, at 907. 
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since intervention will be denied only if C does not have a liberty or 
property interest that is threatened with impairment. 
B. Timeliness 
1. Providing a Reasonable Opportunity To Be Heard 
Suppose that C satisfies the first two requirements of Rule 24, but 
that intervention is denied because C failed to make a timely motion. 
As noted above, that fact alone does not mean that C has been denied 
due process even if the collateral attack bar precludes any other relief. 
The state may restrict the right to judicial relief, including limiting the 
time during which relief can be 'obtained; hence, statutes of limitations 
are constitutional. 
On the other hand, to say that the state may limit the availability 
of relief does not mean that the state can do whatever it pleases. A law 
requiring C to file within 30 seconds after C's claim accrued would be 
unconstitutional, as would a law allowing a limitation period to run 
before C had reason to know of his claim. 86 Due process requires that 
a party have a reasonable period of time to seek relief after that party 
knows or should know that legal action is necessary. The question is 
whether Rule 24's timeliness requirement satisfies this standard. 
In passing on the timeliness of a petition for leave to intervene, 
courts consider four factors: (1) the length of time the intervenor 
knew or should have known of his interest in the case before he sought 
to intervene; (2) the extent of the prejudice to existing parties caused 
by the intervenor's delay in intervening; (3) the extent of the prejudice 
to the intervenor if his motion is denied; and ( 4) the existence of un-
usual circumstances militating either for or against a determination 
that the application is timely. 87 
In practice, the first two factors - whether the intervenor delayed 
in seeking to intervene after he knew or should have known that inter-
vention was necessary, and whether the existing parties were 
86. See Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902). The requirements of procedural due 
process apply even if the state need not have given C a claim in the first place: "While the 
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest ... , it may not constitutionally authorize 
the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
87. Stallsworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-66 (5th Cir. 1977); Fiandaca v. Cunning-
ham, 827 F.2d 825, 833-35 (1st Cir. 1987); South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 612-13 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Reeves v. Wilkes, 754 F.2d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 1985). Although some courts have described the 
factors in slightly different ways, e.g., Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 
1982) (five factors), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Nevilles v. EEOC, 511 F.2d 303, 305 (8th 
Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (three factors), the considerations actually taken into account are the 
same everywhere. 
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prejudiced by his failure to act sooner - tend to be determinative; the 
other factors are usually mentioned in passing, and then only to rein-
force a conclusion already suggested by the court's analysis of the first 
two factors. 88 As a result, Rule 24's timeliness requirement resembles 
the equitable doctrine of laches more than it resembles an ordinary 
statute of limitations. 89 But this difference does not affect the due pro-
cess analysis. The question is still whether the timeliness requirement 
of Rule 24 provides third parties who cannot file an independent law-
suit because of the collateral attack bar a reasonable period of time to 
seek judicial relief after they know or should know that such relief 
may be necessary. 
It is not particularly fruitful to answer this question by examining 
what courts have done in practice. Courts that enforce the collateral 
attack bar have ignored its due process implications. Third parties 
have not invariably been denied due process, but there certainly are 
cases in which they have been treated unfairly.90 Therefore, rather 
than attempt to explain the decisions, I will describe how Rule 24's 
timeliness requirement should be applied if the collateral attack bar is 
to be enforced in a way that assures third parties minimal due process 
protection. 91 
The first step is to determine when C knew or should have known 
that his interests were threatened. At what point, in other words, can 
the state impose a duty on C to take legal action within a reasonable 
time or lose the right to relief? The simplest answer is when B actually 
injures C. This is how ordinary statutes of limitations are triggered. 
Thus, C would not have to think about intervening until B imple-
mented the consent decree by taking the action that C believes is un-
lawful. In the employment discrimination hypothetical, for example, 
this would occur when B instituted affirmative action and denied C a 
promotion or deprived him of seniority. 
Courts that apply the collateral attack bar begin measuring the 
timeliness of a motion to intervene earlier. Specifically, they measure 
timeliness from when a consent decree is entered.92 Under this inter-
88. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 87. 
89. For a discussion of !aches, see 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
§§ 19-36 (1905). 
90. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 160-64, 171-74 (discussing Devereaux v. Geary, 596 F. 
Supp. 1481 (D. Mass. 1984), affd., 165 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985)); Laycock, supra note 3, at 139-
41 (citing cases). 
91. Rule 24 was intended to be used flexibly to reach pragmatic solutions in the multitude of 
possible intervention situations. See FED. R. Clv. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966); 
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984} (Friendly, 
J.); 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1904, at 239. 
92. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 798 F.2d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 1986}, cert. denied, 
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pretation of Rule 24, C must anticipate injury and begin to plan legal 
action before it is actually inflicted. 
Generally speaking, a rule that triggers the _duty to· intervene from 
the time a consent decree is entered will satisfy due process. Once C 
learns of the consent decree, C has notice that A and B will act. If the 
effect of their action on C is apparent, all that stands between C and 
injury is the possibility that B might fail to perform (an unlikely event 
since entry of a consent decree subjects B to contempt sanctions). That 
being so, C can be required to take legal steps before the injury is 
actually inflicted - especially if there is some reason for wanting the 
legality of A and B's agreement settled. Chas a full and fair opportu-
nity to protect his interests and may be deemed to waive any further 
claims when he fails to take advantage of that opportunity.93 • 
One cannot, however, draw a bright line ·saying that the determina-
tion of timeliness can always begin after the consent decree is entered. 
For example, most consent decrees are entered in class actions, and 
notice to the class typically reaches interested third parties.94 But 
there may be cases in which a third party has no occasion to learn of 
the consent decree until after it is entered. In such cases, the timeli-
ness of a motion· to intervene should be measured from when the party 
learned or should have learned about the consent decree. 
There may also be cases in which knowledge that a consent decree 
has been entered is not enough to trigger a duty to intervene. Some-
times, for instance, a third party may not acquire an interest until after 
the consent decree has been approved: the hypothetical case of an ap-
plicant denied a job or promotion under a consent decree entered 
when he was a child, a favorite in the literature, 95 is an example. 
Other times, notice of a consent decree may not put a third party suffi-
ciently on notice that his interests are threatened. For example, af- . 
firmative action plans seldom indicate which employees will be 
108 S. Ct. 771 (1988); Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1978); Stallworth v. Monsanto 
Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-65, 267 (5th Cir. 1977); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.RD. 
289, 294-95 (N.D. Calif. 1976), ajfd. sub nom Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978). 
93. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (does not violate due process to require 
defendant to challenge regulation when passed rather than waiting until it is applied); Peabody 
Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 1975); Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 
925 (7th Cir. 1974); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1125 (1973). 
94. Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 920. Thus, in employment discrimination cases, notice of 
the consent decree is posted at the workplace where both minority and nonminority employees 
can be expected to see it. 
95. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 163; Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 925-26. It does 
not appear that this case has ever arisen in the real world. 
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affected; they establish employment goals that call for some places to 
be held for minority applicants, leaving many employees unaffected. 
This may be enough to impose a duty on a union to intervene, but not 
enough to impose a similar duty on every individual who could lose an 
employment benefit. Assistant Attorney General Cooper argues that 
the claim of an individual in this situation is so uncertain that he could 
not intervene because his claim would not be "ripe" for adjudication.96 
Although Cooper may be wrong,97 one need not go so far to conclude 
that an employee in this situation should be allowed to wait until it is 
clear that he will be affected before challenging a consent decree. 
Finally, this analysis suggests that it would violate due process to 
begin measuring the timeliness of a motion to intervene before a con-
sent decree is entered. 98 Even if C knows that A and B are negotiating 
and might settle at C's expense, the threat to C's interests is too uncer-
tain to trigger a duty to intervene. The likelihood of injury increases 
once A and B reach agreement and offer to have that agreement en-
tered as a consent decree. But the settlement still may not go through 
because the court may refuse to enter the decree. 
The second step in applying Rule 24's timeliness requirement con-
sistently with the due process clause is to determine what constitutes a 
reasonable period of time after C knew or should have known that 
intervention was necessary. As noted above, timeliness in this context 
is determined like the equitable doctrine of laches, on the basis of how 
long C waited to intervene and how much A and B were prejudiced by 
C's delay. It is hard to generalize about what is necessary to satisfy 
due process, since what is reasonable here necessarily differs from case 
to case. In general, courts have been fairly lenient in allowing parties 
time to intervene after they should have known that intervention was 
96. Cooper, supra note 3, at 171-74. 
97. These claims probably are ripe for adjudication. See generally L. TRIBE, AM&RICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-10 (2d ed. 1988) (for a general overview of the ripeness require-
ment). In any event, the better position is not to impose a rigid ripeness requirement and to 
allow third-party intervention upon entry of the decree. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 
68-69 (1986) Qeaving open whether an intervenor's claims need to satisfy the requirements of an 
independent action before an Article III court). 
98. See, e.g., County of Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1605 (1987); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1980) (the court 
measured timeliness from when the lawsuit was filed). In the Ninth Circuit case, the court's 
analysis was clearly dependent on the assumption that future litigation was not barred. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court apparently overlooked Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of 
Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981), which held that collateral attacks were barred. It 
is not clear whether this signals an abandonment of the collateral attack bar or whether the court 
will modify its approach to timeliness in light of Dennison. 
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necessary.99 However, in the context of the collateral attack bar, 
judges need to be sensitive to the time it may take unorganized third 
parties to decide to litigate. 100 Relevant guidance for determining how 
much time is reasonable can be found in cases dealing with amend-
ments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 as well as common 
law laches cases. 
2. Mullane and the Requirement of Formal Notice 
Other commentators argue that the standards described above are 
not enough to protect the due process rights of third parties subject to 
the collateral attack bar. These commentators maintain that third 
parties are also entitled to notice of the consent decree that complies 
with Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 101 In Mullane, a 
trust company petitioned for a judicial settlement of accounts which 
would bind everyone with any interest in the trust funds; the only no-
tice to trust beneficiaries was by newspaper publication. The Supreme 
Court held this notice inadequate, imposing an affirmative duty on 
plaintiffs to give defendants formal notice of legal proceedings. Mul-
lane held that the defendant is entitled to such notice even if he al-
ready knows that proceedings are pending. Thus, the trust 
beneficiaries represented by Mullane had actual notice of the proceed-
ings before final judgment was entered.102 The Court held that this 
did not satisfy due process because trust beneficiaries were entitled to 
notice from the bank. 103 According to the Mullane Court, the plaintiff 
must provide "the best notice practicable"104 under the circumstances. · 
The means chosen "must be such as one desirous of actually informing 
the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."105 If a defen-
dant's identity and whereabouts are known, the plaintiff must mail or 
personally serve specific notice of the action; otherwise publication no-
99. See generally 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1916, at 430 & n.11; 3B J. 
MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 80, ~ 24.13. 
100. In employment discrimination cases, for example, minority plaintiffs tend to be organ-
ized through the litigation system itself. That is, their attorneys will do the organizational work, 
either for ideological reasons or for attorney's fees or both. Unless there is a well-financed union, 
the same is not likely to be true for nonminority workers, who, even if they prevail, will not get 
attorney's fees (though they may have to pay their opponents' fees if they lose, see Zipes v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 846 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
101. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See Laycock, supra note 3, at 139-43; Cooper, supra note 3, at 161-
68; Comment, Collateral Attacks, supra note 3, at 154-62. 
102. Mullane appeared specially before final judgment to contest the failure of the bank to 
notify the trust beneficiaries of the proceedings. 339 U.S. at 311. 
103. 339 U.S. at 319. 
104. 339 U.S. at 317. 
105. 339 U.S. at 315. 
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tice will suffice. 106 
Applying Mullane to third parties subject to the collateral attack 
bar means that A and B must notify potential Cs of a proposed con-
sent decree. Absent such notice, C must be permitted to intervene 
even if C knew about the consent decree and regardless of how long C 
waited to act. 
It is not apparent why third parties must receive such notice. Op-
ponents of the collateral attack bar observe that notice under Mullane 
is always required before an adjudication that is to be accorded final-
ity, and argue that a consent decree between A and B that affects C's 
rights is just that - a binding judgment against C. 107 Of course, this 
is not literally true: no one has ever suggested, for example, that the 
consent decree renders C's claims res judicata. But opponents of the 
collateral attack bar reason that if the effect of the bar together with 
Rule 24's timeliness requirement precludes C from challenging a con-
sent decree, it is as if the decree was a judgment against C. Therefore, 
Mullane applies, and C is entitled to "the best notice practicable" from 
A and B before the consent decree is entered. 
This argument overlooks an important difference between a judg-
ment against C and a consent decree that affects C. The judgment 
forecloses C's cl,aim with respect to something that occurred prior to 
its entry. The consent decree gives rise to C's claim in the first place. 
When intervention is denied on timeliness grounds, it is not because 
C's rights were determined when the consent decree was entered: it is 
because C waited too long after entry of the decree to make his claim. 
Rule 24's tim.eliness requirement is thus more properly analogized 
to a statute of limitations: A and B have done something - made an 
agreement - that C believes violates his rights, and C's challenge to 
that agreement is dismissed because C waited too long to bring it. To 
be sure, A and B hav~ entered the agreement as a judgment to facilitate 
its enforcement as between themselves. But they have not brought an 
action or sought or obtained a judgment against C. On the contrary, it 
is C who is suing. Entering the agreement as a consent decree restricts 
C's options in bringing this suit: whereas C could ordinarily challenge 
the agreement at any time within the applicable statute of limitations, 
c must now intervene in the consent decree proceedings within the 
time allowed by Rule 24. But that means only that the limitations 
period on C's claim has been shortened, not that a judgment has been 
rendered against C. 
106. 339 U.S. at 317, 318. 
107. See authorities cited supra note 75. 
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The proper question, then, is whether Mullane-type notice ought 
to be required to bar a party's claims under a statute of limitations. 
Given current practice, the answer to this question seems obviously to 
be no.108 However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Tulsa Pro-
fessional Collection Services v. Pope 109 can be read to suggest that no-
tice under Mullane is required for limitations periods that (like the 
collateral attack bar) are triggered by legal proceedings. Therefore, 
further investigation of the notice requirement is merited. 
The opinion in Mullane does not explain why formal notice from 
opposing parties is essential before a court can issue a binding judg-
ment. Certainly such notice is not essential to ensure the "fundamen-
tal fairness" at the heart of the due process clause. As described by 
the Court in Mullane, the essence of the notice requirement is that a 
party should know that his liberty or property is threatened so that he 
"can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or 
contest."110 Why should it matter whether this knowledge comes di-
rectly from one's opponent? The critical issue is whether a party 
knows or should know that his interests are threatened and that he has 
an opportunity to be heard. The source of that information is 
unimportant. 
The more stringent requirements of Mullane can be justified on the 
basis of administrative costs: the cost of requiring A to give B formal 
notice when A seeks a judgment against B is low in comparison to the 
potential cost of adjudicating disputes about when B knew or should 
have known of A's action. On this view, Mullane establishes a prophy-
lactic rule that imposes a duty on plaintiffs to give defendants notice in 
order to eliminate the need for case-by-case inquiries into when de-
fendants knew or should have known about proceedings. 
But the fact that formal notice is cost-effective does not explain 
why it is constitutionally required. The due process clause ought to 
leave the decision to adopt more efficient procedures to the legislature. 
Due process requires only that the procedures employed in adjudica-
tion not be "fundamentally unfair." As. explained above, the notice 
required by Mullane is not necessary to satisfy this requirement. If the 
state wants its courts to engage in case-by-case inquiries, that is its 
business - so long as no one is barred without a reasonable opportu-
nity to be heard after he knows or should know that legal action is 
necessary. 
108. The Supreme Court so held in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531-38 (1982). 
109. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988). -
110. 339 U.S. at 314. 
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The most persuasive justification for Mullane is that formal notice 
of a lawsuit is an established part of due process by history and tradi-
tion - "process" in its original sense (the thing the process server 
brings). But while tradition is a perfectly acceptable basis for the rule, 
there is no reason to extend the constitutional requirement of Mul-
lane-type notice beyond its historical confines: a suit by A to obtain a 
binding judgment against B. 
Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope 111 is not to the con-
trary. Tulsa concerned Oklahoma's so-called "nonclaim statute," 
which required creditors to file contract claims against an estate 
within two months of published notice that probate proceedings had 
been commenced. Failure to file within two months barred a claim 
whether or not the estate had been closed. Appellant, a creditor 
whose claim was barred by this provision, argued that it was entitled 
to notice of the probate proceedings from the estate. Appellee re-
sponded that because the nonclaim statute was a statute of limitations, 
notice under Mullane was not required. 
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor explained that Mullane-
type notice is not required for ordinary statutes of limitations because 
the state's "limited involvement" in the running of a "self-executing" 
statute of limitations "falls short of constituting the type of state ac-
tion required to implicate the protections of the Due Process 
Clause."112 The nonclaim statute, however, was triggered by the initi-
ation of proceedings in the probate court and the issuance of an order 
from that court directing that notice be published. 113 According to 
the Court, "[w]here the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time 
bar, even if those proceedings do not necessarily resolve the claim on 
its merits, the time bar lacks the self-executing feature ... necessary to 
remove any due process problem."114 The Court then balanced the 
creditors' need for notice against the state's interest in expeditious res-
olution of probate proceedings and held that publication notice was 
inadequate to bar appellant's claim. 
The Court's reasoning in Tulsa is debatable. For example, the 
holding that Mullane does not apply to statutes of limitations because 
dismissal on this ground does not entail state action seems plainly 
wrong. 115 But the important point is that Tulsa does not hold that, 
111. 108 S. Ct. 1340. 
112. 108 S. Ct. at 1345. 
113. 108 S. Ct. at 1345-46. 
114. 108 S. Ct. at 1346. 
115. The Court recognizes that a cause of action is property protected by the due process 
clause, 108 S. Ct. at 1344-45, but reasons that it is the passage of time and not the state that 
deprives the plaintiff of this property. But the passage of time merely establishes the condition 
November 1988] Consent Decrees and Third Parties 349 
where there is state action, only notice under Mullane will satisfy the 
due process clause. It does not hold that Oklahoma could not - if it 
chose - allow its courts to make a case-by-case inquiry and bar those 
creditors who had or should have had actual notice of the probate 
proceedings from any source. Such an approach was neither advo-
cated by the parties nor considered by the Court in Tulsa because it 
would have been inconsistent with the nonclaim statute. Oklahoma 
did not want case-by-case inquiries: Oklahoma wanted an irrebuttable 
presumption that all claims not filed within two months of the opening 
of an estate were barred. The Court quite rightly held that publication 
notice was inadequate for this purpose: such a presumption requires 
formal notice. 116 The Court's analysis in Tulsa simply does not speak 
to whether Oklahoma could have limited its statutory bar to creditors 
who waited more than two months after they knew or should have 
known that probate proceedings were initiated. For the reasons ex-
plained above, I think it could have. 117 
C. Adequate Representation 
The final requirement for intervention of right under Rule 24 is 
that the applicant's interest is not "adequately represented by existing 
parties."118 This requirement is actually more troubling from the 
standpoint of the due process clause than the requirement that a mo-
tion to intervene be timely, since it may deny a hearing to a third party 
who has diligently pursued his interests. Indeed, where a separate suit 
is barred by the collateral attack bar, denying intervention to a party 
that authorizes the deprivation. A cause of action is a right to judicial relief. The plaintiff is 
deprived of this right when the court dismisses his complaint. That is state action. 
The Court relies on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). In Flagg Bros., a warehouse-
man proposed to sell the plaintiff's goods to recover unpaid storage charges. Plaintiff brought an 
action alleging that this sale deprived her of property without due process. The Court reasoned 
that the state law permitting the sale did not deprive plaintiff of any property: the deprivation 
occurred when her goods were sold. The state was not involved in the sale. Therefore, the 
plaintiff was not deprived of property by the state. 
The Tulsa Court apparently reasoned that the running of a limitations period is analogous to 
the sale in Flagg Bros. Unlike a sale of goods, however, the passage of time does not deprive the 
plaintiff of any property. Rather, as noted above, the plaintiff is not actually deprived of his right 
to relief until the court dismisses his complaint. It is this dismissal, then, that is analogous to the 
sale in Flagg Bros., and that plainly involves state action since it is ordered by the court. 
116. Challenges to a consent decree could similarly be barred if A and B did give potential Cs 
formal notice under Mullane. 
117. This approach would not have changed the result in Tulsa. The nonclaim statute re-
quired the executor to publish notice in "some newspaper" in the county once each week for two 
consecutive weeks. 108 S. Ct. at 1342. There was no showing that appellant had seen the news-
paper or had actual knowledge of the commencement of probate proceedings, and appellant was 
not negligent in failing to see such notice or to monitor filings in the state courts. 
118. FED. R. av. P. 24(a)(2). 
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who has an interest that will be impaired and who has sought judicial 
relief in a timely fashion is indistinguishable from res judicata. 
However, while it is generally true that a prior adjudication cannot 
bar a litigant who was neither a party nor in privity with a party, this 
is not always true. Due process permits the preclusion of other liti-
gants if their interests are sufficiently close to the interests of the par-
ties.119 This, for instance, is what makes class actions possible. 
The history of Rule 24's representation requirement makes clear 
that "adequate representation" under Rule 24 means adequate to per-
mit preclusion under the due process clause. The original version of 
Rule 24 authorized intervention of right when "the representation of 
the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be [in]adequate 
and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action."120 
In Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 121 the Supreme Court held 
that a party was "adequately represented" within the meaning of this 
provision only if the party could be bound by a judgment.122 This 
interpretation made it impossible to satisfy the Rule: if a party was 
not adequately represented - as required by the first clause of the 
Rule - that party would not be bound as a matter of due process -
thus failing to satisfy the second clause. And the only way a party 
could ~how that he might be bound was by showing that he was ade-
quately represented by existing parties - in which case intervention 
would again be denied. This "Catch-22" was eliminated in 1966 by 
amending the requirement that the applicant be bound, to require only 
that he have an interest that will be impaired "as a practical mat-
ter. "123 The 1966 amendment did not change the meaning of "ade-
quate representation," however, so representation sufficient to bind as 
a matter of due process is still required.124 Therefore, if Rule 24 is 
properly applied, denying intervention to a third party subject to the 
collateral attack bar on this ground will not violate the due process 
119. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 
U.S. 356 (1921); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir. 1950) (Goodrich, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); REsrATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment a 
(1942); Developments in the Law - Res Judicata'. 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 855-56 (1952). 
120. The original Rule 24 is set out in 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 
~ 24.01(1.-1]. 
121. 366 U.S. 683 (1961). 
122. 366 U.S. at 691 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)). 
123. See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2); Rule 24 advisory committee's note (1966). 
124. See 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 80, ~ 24.07[4], at 24-68; 7C WRIGHT, 
MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1909, at 313. Thus, intervention may be denied where there 
is representation by a fiduciary, such as an executor or a trustee; where a group, like a corpora-
tion or a labor union, speaks for its members; or where the interests of existing parties are other-
wise identical to those of the applicant for intervention. Id. at 330-45. 
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clause.125 
There is one respect in which precluding litigation under Rule 24's 
"adequate representation" requirement may differ from other contexts . 
in which litigation is precluded on the basis of representation by 
others: the way in which the burdens of pleading and persuasion are 
allocated. Res judicata is ordinarily an affirmative defense, and the 
party seeking to preclude litigation must plead and prove that the 
party now seeking to litigate was adequately represented in the earlier 
action. 126 In only one instance does the party seeking to litigate have 
the burden of showing inadequate representation: when a member of 
a class is not satisfied with the results achieved by the class representa-
tive and seeks to relitigate. 127 But shifting the burden of proof in this 
context may be justified by the class representative's demonstration, at 
the outset of the case, that he could adequately represent the interests 
of the class.12s 
The courts are currently divided over how to allocate the burden of 
proving inadequate representation under Rule 24.129 Some courts re-
quire the party or parties opposing intervention to show that they al-
ready adequately represent the prospective intervenor's interests. In 
these jurisdictions, preclusion under Rule 24 is no different from an 
ordinary defense of res judicata. In other jurisdictions, however, the 
burden is on the would-be intervenor to show that his interests are not 
adequately represented. Since there has been no prior showing to jus-
tify even a rebuttable presumption of adequate representation, as in a 
class action suit, we must ask whether this violates due process. 
The burden of proof should not be critical. Burdens of proof mat-
ter only in close cases, and none of the cases in which third parties 
have been denied the right to int~rvene and challenge a consent decree 
have been close on the issue of adequate representation. Representa-
125. As noted above, courts have not always been sensitive to the relationship between Rule 
24 and the due process clause. There are cases (none involving the collateral attack bar) in which 
intervention was denied even though representation by existing parties probably would not have 
permitted preclusion under the due process clause. See, e.g., Ionian Shipping Co. v. British Law 
Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1970) (mortgagee of ship denied intervention in suit between 
shipping company and its insurer); 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1909, at 351 
& n.46. This would not be permissible in cases subject to the collateral attack bar. 
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
127. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797 (1985). 
128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
129. Compare 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1909, at 314-15 & nn.S-6 
(citing cases) (burden on party opposing intervention) with 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra 
note 80, ~ 24.07[4], at 24-70-71 & nn.9-11 (citing cases) (burden on party seeking to intervene) 
and Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329, 353-54 
(1969) (same). 
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tion is inadequate whenever there is a "significant possibility" that the 
interests of the applicant may be given short shrift by the parties.130 
Both courts and commentators have recognized that this standard is 
met anytime two parties can settle their lawsuit at the expense of a 
third party.131 Consequently, Rule 24's adequate representation re-
quirement is satisfied almost automatically in cases falling under the 
collateral attack bar. There is no reason to think that current class 
action practice establishes the outer limits of representational litiga-
tion, and - much as I hate to use the cliche - it would exalt form 
over substance to hold the opportunity to litigate provided by Rule 24 
unconstitutional for reasons that never matter in practice. 
In addition, the burden placed on prospective intervenors to show 
inadequate representation is "minimal."132 It is hard to believe that 
requiring the prospective intervenor to make this minimal showing 
renders mandatory intervention under Rule 24 unconstitutional. If it 
does, the solution is to shift the burden of proof to parties opposing 
intervention in cases where the applicant is barred from bringing an 
independent suit by the collateral attack bar. As noted above, Rule 24 
is flexible enough to accommodate this sort of change. 133 
IV. AND THEN WHAT? 
What can third parties do once they are before the court? What 
claims can they raise? What remedies can they obtain? These ques-
tions arise whether third parties are present as intervenors under Rule 
24 or whether their separate lawsuit is consolidated with a consent 
decree proceeding. 
A. Third-Party Claims and the Power To Prevent a Settlement 
The reasons for wanting third-party challenges to a consent decree 
brought before the court that entered the decree are procedural: to 
avoid wasteful duplication of effort and to prevent jurisdictional con-
flicts that arise from contradictory judgments. It follows that once 
130. 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1909, at 316 & n.7, 346 & n.43; see 
Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 
1967). 
131. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employ. Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1499 
(11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); Bolden v. 
Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1978); Laycock, supra note 3, at 110-13; 
Cooper, supra note 3, at 156, 168-70. 
132. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); 7C WRIGHT, 
MILLER & KANE, supra note 67, § 1909, at 346; 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 80, 
~ 24.07[4], at 24-71 & n.10. 
133. See supra note 91. 
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third parties are before the court that entered the consent decree, they 
should be able to raise whatever substantive claims they could have 
raised in a separate action. In the hypothetical employment discrimi-
nation case, for example, if C thought that an affirmative action plan 
agreed to by B violated his rights under Title VII or the fourteenth 
amendment, he could present these claims to the court that. entered 
the decree.134 
But what if the court held that the affirmative action plan did not 
violate any of C's rights? Would that end the matter, or could C do 
more? A number of courts and commentators assume that once a 
third party has intervened and been made a "party" to a consent de-
cree proceeding, the third party can force adjudication of the primary 
dispute even though the other parties want to settle.135 This means 
that if C is permitted to intervene in an employment discrimination 
suit brought by A against B, C can force litigation of A's discrimina-
tion claim even if A wants to settle. No one has considered whether C 
could also do this if he was before the court by way of consolidation 
rather than intervention. There is no need to dwell on that question, 
however, for the assumption that an intervenor can litigate other par-
ties' claims is unfounded. 
Start with a case in which A and B sign an ordinary contract re-
quiring B to do something that C believes violates his rights. If C 
brings a separate lawsuit and fails to prove this claim, C's case will be 
dismissed and the contract will remain in force. This is true even if the 
agreement "injures" C by leaving him somehow worse off. Thus, if C 
alleged that B's agreement to institute affirmative action violated Title 
VII, but the court concluded that the plan was permissible under 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 136 C's complaint would be dismissed 
even though the affirmative action disadvantaged C Not every "in-
jury" gives rise to a right to judicial relief. C must plead and prove 
that the facts causing the injury violate some rule of positive law that 
C is entitled to enforce, i.e., C must have a cause of action. 
134. See Local 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 530 (1986). 
135. See, e.g., Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 798 F.2d 389, 390-91 (10th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 927 (1987); United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (en bane); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Simmonds Precision Prods., 319 F. Supp. 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 3B J. MOORE & J. KEN-
NEDY, supra note 80, ~ 24.16[4]; Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 921; see also Note, The ITI 
Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent Decree Procedures, 73 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 594, 
623 (1973); cf. Epstein, supra note 3, at 228-29. But see Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360, 
364 (6th Cir. 1986), cerl denied, 107 S. Ct. 1576 (1987). A few commentators assume that an 
intervenor can force litigation of the main claim, and then suggest that this can be prevented by 
conditioning intervention on the intervenor's waiver of this right. See Schwarzschild, supra note 
1, at 932-33; Comment, Collateral Attacks, supra note 3, at 180. 
136. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
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Now suppose that instead of (or in addition to) an unsuccessful 
Title VII claim, C asked the court to declare the contract between A 
and B void on the ground that B made the contract only to avoid A's 
lawsuit and A's claim was meritless. Relief should again be denied: 
allegations that B made a foolish or unnecessary contract do not state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.137 Nor could C argue that 
he wants to litigate A's claim for A, since C cannot litigatejus tertii. 138 
Now suppose thatA andB have their contract entered as a consent 
decree and that there is no collateral attack bar. Once again, C brings 
a separate action alleging that the terms of the consent decree violate 
his rights but fails to prove the claim. If C then seeks to have the 
agreement set aside by showing that A's claim had no merit, should 
the result be any different? The fact that the contract was entered as a 
consent decree alters the manner in which it will be enforced and im-
plemented ·as between A and B, but it has no bearing on what rights C 
has - or ought to have - to set the contract aside. 
Now assume that C's separate claim is consolidated with the con-
sent decree proceedings. Should that change the result? Consolida-
tion is ordered to ensure comity between courts and to conserve 
judicial resources. Thus, while C may still raise whatever claims C 
could have raised against A or B if a separate lawsuit was permitted, 
there is no reason to alter or expand C's substantive rights beyond 
that. 
Finally, suppose that rather than filing an independent lawsuit, C 
makes a successful motion to intervene in the action between A and B. 
If, once again, we assume that C fails to prove an independent cause of 
action, why should C suddenly acquire the right to force an adjudica-
tion of the claim between A and B? Commentators have assumed that 
this right follows from the fact that an intervenor is a "party."139 But 
attaching the label "party" does not determine what the intervenor's 
137. If B is a government agency subject to the Administrative Procedures Act, C may be 
able to argue that B's foolish contract is "arbitrary and capricious." Alternatively, C can try to 
prove an implicit contract between himself and B that limited B's power to act. Suppose, for 
example, that C worked for B but that C's employment contract did not expressly protect senior-
ity rights. If B settled a lawsuit by agreeing to promote A over C. C could try to show an implicit 
agreement that B could not deprive C of seniority without adequate justification and argue that 
settling a frivolous lawsuit did not meet this condition: ' 
138. Some commentators have suggested that existing limitations on the power to !itigatejus 
tertii are too stringent. See, e.g., Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 314 
(1984); Note, Standing To Assert Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 443 (1974). These criticisms 
are addressed to cases in which the parties whose rights are infringed cannot protect themselves 
and a third party wants to do it for them. It is hard to argue that C should be able to litigate A's 
claim when A wants to settle, and C's reason for wanting to litigate is to depriveA of the benefits 
of the settlement. 
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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rights as a party are. In ordinary litigation, if two plaintiffs bring in-
dependent claims against a single defendant, those claims may be 
joined so that all three parties and both claims are dealt with in a 
single proceeding. It does not follow that either plaintiff can litigate 
the other plaintiff's claim if the other plaintiff chooses to settle. Both 
plaintiffs are "parties" - but this means only that each plaintiff has 
full procedural rights in the action to pursue his claims, present his 
evidence and seek whatever relief he deserves. Whether a party be-
comes a "party" by joinder, consolidation or intervention should not 
matter.' As a party, the intervenor can litigate the same claims that he 
could have litigated in a separate lawsuit, but only those claims. Lim-
its on litigating jus tertii are no less applicable to intervenors than to 
every other party. Indeed, any other result would make Rule 24 inva-
lid under the Rules Enabling Act. 140 
This interpretation does not render the right to intervene useless in 
cases where the intervenor has no cause of action. 141 The right to in-
tervene may prove valuable if A and B do not settle, as the intervenor's 
right to put in evidence, cross-examine witnesses and generally make 
its concerns known to the court may influence the shape of any rem-
edy finally awarded. If A and B wish to settle, however, C cannot 
prevent them from doing so; C can only force an adjudication of 
claims that C could have raised in a separate lawsuit. 
This understanding of intervenors' rights explains the Supreme 
Court's much-misunderstood opinion in Local 93, International Asso-
ciation of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 142 which presented the facts 
of the employment discrimination hypothetical used throughout this 
article. The Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of black and 
Hispanic firefighters, sued the City of Cleveland alleging race discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII and the fourteenth amendment. After 
prolonged negotiation, the Vanguards and the City reached a settle-
ment, which they sought to have entered as a consent decree. Local 93 
of the International Association of Firefighters intervened on behalf of 
white firefighters opposing the decree. Arguing that once intervention 
was granted it became a party to the action, the Union maintained that 
no consent decree could be entered without its consent. The Union 
140. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substan-
tive rights ..•. "). 
141. Intervention is often permitted in such cases. An obvious example is private interven-
tion in an enforcement proceeding that can be brought only by a government agency or official. 
See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972). 
142. 478 U.S. 501 (1986). Professor Laycock, for example, apparently believes that the 
Union (CJ should have been able to block entry of the consent decree unless the plaintiffs (AJ and 
the City (BJ proved some sort of claim against it. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 108-113. 
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never claimed that the terms of the proposed decree violated the rights 
of its members under Title VII or the Constitution or anything else.143 
Indeed, despite several express requests from the judge that it make a 
legal claim, the Union failed to do more than protest that the consent 
decree was unreasonable because a less drastic remedy might suf-
fice.144 The Court held that the Union could prevent the Vanguards 
and the City from settling and thus block the consent decree only if it 
could prove that the decree violated its legal rights.14s 
B. Determining the Proper Remedy for Successful 
Third-Party Claims 
What remedy should the court grant if C succeeds in proving that 
the terms of a consent decree violate his rights? It is useful again to 
begin with a private contract case. Thus, suppose A and B make a 
contract to initiate affirmative action. If C sues B and proves that this 
contract violates his rights under Title VII, C is entitled to relief in the 
form of an injunction prohibiting further discrimination. 146 The fact 
that this relief would render B's contract with A unenforceable poses 
no obstacle. B cannot act illegally, and the fact that B agreed with 
someone else to take illegal action does not make the action any less 
illegal. This is t~e whether the affirmative action settled litigation or 
served some other purpose. Of course A and B remain free to make a 
new agreement that is not illegal. 
Now suppose that the affirmative action plan settles litigation and 
that the parties have it entered as a consent decree. C joins the litiga-
tion - it does not matter for these purposes whether C joins via Rule 
24 or through a consolidated lawsuit - and proves that the agreement 
violates his rights. The result should be the same: C is entitled to an 
injunction prohibiting further discrimination. The fact that the court 
agreed to enter the settlement as a judgment does not extend power to 
B to engage in unlawful activity. 
There is a difference, however, between the private contract and 
the consent decree. If the affirmative action plan was embodied in a 
private contract, the court would simply declare the contract unen-
forceable and entitled to no e:lfect.147 There would be no agreement, 
143. 478 U.S. at 504-08. 
144. 478 U.S. at 507, 511, 530. 
145. 478 U.S. at 528-30. 
146. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers 
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); 
Lilly v. City ofBeckley, 797 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1986); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
147. See, e.g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 670 (1899); Duncan v. Black, 324 
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and A and B would have to renegotiate. They might reach a new 
agreement that was not illegal. Or, if the changes necessary to make 
their agreement legal were more than one or both parties was willing 
to accept, they might end up litigating after all. If the agreement had 
been entered as a consent decree, by contrast, the court would have 
the additional option of modifying the decree, even over the objection 
of one of the parties, to bring it within the limits of the law.148 Exer-
cising this option results in enforcing a bargain different from the one 
made by the parties.149 
Should the court exercise its power to modify the decree and bind 
the parties to a revised agreement? This presents again the question of 
whether to treat a consent decree as a contract or a judgment. If con-
sent decrees are contracts, a successful third-party challenge to the 
legality of a decree should lead the court to vacate the decree.150 If 
consent decrees are judgments, the court can vacate but can also mod-
ify when warranted by the facts of the case.151 So far, and for reasons 
that are best described as tautological, the Supreme Court has opted 
for the judgment label.152 
As discussed in Part I, the question is not whether the consent 
decree is a contract or judgment, but what rule best advances the rea-
son for offering the consent decree option: viz, facilitating settle-
ment.153 Here we have three alternatives: (1) declare the decree 
unenforceable, leaving no agreement in place; (2) modify the decree to 
comply with the law, enforcing the modified agreement in place of the 
agreement made by the parties; or (3) leave the court discretion to 
choose between these two options depending on the equities of the case 
and the extent to which modification alters the original bargain. 
S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Everet v. Williams, Y.B. 12 Geo. 1, fo. 43 (Ex. 1725), discussed 
in Note, The Highwayman's Case, 9 LAW Q. REV. 197 (1893); R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CoNTRACTS §§ 178, 197 (1981); E.A. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS ch. 5 (1982); Gellhorn, Con-
tracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 680 (1935); Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly 
Horse: Public Policy in the Law of Contract, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1972). 
148. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. 
149. Alternatively, both parties might agree to a modification, which would be the same 
thing as making a new contract, or both might agree to litigate. 
150. The court would have to decide whether a party to the consent decree who had given 
consideration could get restitution. The general rule seems to say no, although as with all con-
tract law there are exceptions. See authorities cited supra note 147. If the consideration was an 
agreement not to sue, vacating the decree. would restore the right to sue. Under the "no-effects" 
rule, the statute of limitations would have continued to run while the consent decree was in force. 
151. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430.32 
(1856); System Fedn. No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 646-50 (1961). 
152. See 364 U.S. at 646-51; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). 
153. This does not appear to be a case in which the goal of facilitating settlement must give 
way to other judicial interests. See supra Part I. 
358 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:321 
The option least likely to impede the settlement process is the one 
that appears most likely ex ante to prove beneficial in the event of a 
successful third-party challenge. This will vary from case to case de-
pending on the costs of enforcing a modified decree versus the costs of 
having no decree and either litigating or negotiating a second agree-
ment. If the part of the consent decree most likely to be challenged by 
a third party is one on which there is no room for give-and-take, the 
parties might favor the first option. If, by contrast, the part most 
likely to be attacked did not require any controversial compromises, 
the second option might seem preferable. This may suggest choosing 
the third alternative and leaving the court discretion to take whatever 
action is appropriate. The problem with that solution, of course, is 
that there is always uncertainty over how (and how well) courts will 
exercise such discretion. 
There is no simple solution to this problem. The choice of options 
depends upon empirical data which are not available. Perhaps the best 
solution is to have the judge require the parties to choose the remedy 
they want in the event the consent decree is subsequently found un-
lawful before entering it. If the parties fail to make a choice, the court 
could exercise discretion to choose the proper remedy. 
V. ADDITIONAL PROTECTION: THE FAIRNESS HEARING 
Abandoning the collateral attack bar and replacing it with a con-
solidation approach, as suggested in Part II, would insure third parties 
basically the same right to challenge a consent decree that they have to 
challenge an ordinary contract. The final question is whether this is 
sufficient or whether third parties are entitled to additional protection. 
Presently, all courts hold a fairness hearing before entering a con-
sent decree. 154 This is a hearing at which interested third parties and 
amici may comment on the advantages or disadvantages of a settle-
ment; after hearing their objections, the court may refuse to enter the 
proposed decree unless the parties revise it to take third-party con-
cerns into account.155 The Supreme Court assumed without actually 
holding that a fairness hearing was required in Local 93 .156 
There is no doubt that courts have authority to hold fairness hear-
154. See, e.g., Ibarra v. Texas Employment Commn., 823 F.2d 873, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1985), ajfd., 478 U.S. 
501 (1986); Bass v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 698 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rubin, J., concurring); Culbreath v. 
Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1980). 
155. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 216 n.20; Laycock, supra note 3, at 137;- Schwarzschild, 
supra note 1, at 911, 914-16. 
156. 478 U.S. 501, 528-29 (1986). 
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ings and to refuse to enter a proposed consent decree unless changes 
are made. The court has discretion to refuse to enter a consent decree 
altogether. 157 Because the court will be closely associated with the 
decree and will be involved in its enforcement, the court may withhold 
its assistance if it considers the agreement inequitable. 158 
But fairness hearings undermine the goal of encouraging settle-
ment. The hearings themselves can be expensive and time-consum-
ing, 159 and any restrictions the judge imposes on the parties' power to 
settle make settlement more difficult and hence less likely.160 Fairness 
hearings may make sense at present, since the collateral attack bar has 
the practical effect of limiting the ability of third parties to protect 
themselves. But if the collateral attack bar is abandoned, and third 
parties can attack the decree if it violates their rights, why should 
courts interfere further on their behalf? No one has suggested requir-
ing a fairness hearing before two parties make an ordinary contract. 
Why is this different? 
There are three possible justifications for requiring fairness hear-
ings prior to approving a consent decree. First, there may be practical 
differences between consent decrees and contracts that make it more 
difficult for third parties to protect themselves even when they can 
seek judicial relief; such differences, if they exist, might justify addi-
tional ex ante protection. Second, there may be a judicial integrity 
concern: because the court will be more closely involved in the en-
forcement and implementation of a consent decree than it would a 
private settlement, it should ensure that the agreement is fair to all 
affected parties. Third, there is a utilitarian argument that the benefits 
of fairness hearings exceed their costs in terms of time, money and lost 
settlements. Benefits in this context include tangible gains from the 
accommodation of additional economic and social interests and simple 
justice from insuring that third parties are treated more fairly. Each 
of these justifications is considered below. 
157. See, e.g., Kasper v. Board of Election Commrs., 814 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987); Williams 
v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
158. See Kaspar, 814 F.2d 332; Williams, 129 F.2d 1554; Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 
212; Note, Private Participation in Department of Justice Antitrust Proceedings, 39 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 143, 156 (1971). . 
159. See, e.g., Local 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 508-10 · 
(1986) (four days of hearings over a two-year period); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 
1554, 1556 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (four-day fairness hearing). 
160. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 876 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 932. This is borne out by cases in 
which parties have incurred the cost of appealing a district court's refusal to enter a proposed 
consent decree rather than revise the decree. E.g., Kasper v. Board of Election Commrs., 814 
F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en 
bane). 
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A. Practical Obstacles 
Professor Laycock suggests that the mere existence of a consent 
decree prevents or hinders third parties from protecting their interests 
in ways that an ordinary contract does not. 161 He cites the following 
examples: (1) if C objects to what B has agreed to do, B can point to a 
judicial decree and tell C that it settles the issue conclusively; (2) B 
will be more reluctant to give in to C's demands if faced with contempt 
sanctions; (3) the judge will be reluctant to spend time on a case he 
thought was off his docket and will therefore "not be favorably dis-
posed to plaintiffs who subsequently reopened the matter and sought 
to litigate it";162 and (4) the court is likely to give the consent decree 
undue weight in subsequent litigation.163 
The first and fourth examples - that C will be daunted by the fact 
that A and B have a judicial decree, and that the court will give the 
decree undue weight against C in litigation - depend on the mis-
perception that consent decrees are quasi-judgments entitled to special 
deference. Articulating the justification for consent decrees reveals 
why a consent decree should have no more force against C than any 
other agreement: entry as a decree is a service provided by the court 
to make it easier for A and B to settle their dispute, and (with the 
single exception of limiting C's choice of forum) the decree limits only 
their rights against one another.164 Assuming that judges and litigants 
are not incapable of understanding this analysis, these two problems 
should cease to exist. 
The objection that B will be more reluctant to give in to C's de-
mands if the agreement has been entered as a consent decree because B 
will fear contempt sanctions may be true, but that fact neither entitles 
C to a fairness hearing nor renders C's right to protect himself by 
bringing a lawsuit inadequate. Finally, the objection that the judge 
will not look kindly on parties who insist on reopening a case the judge 
thought was ended (assuming that it is true and that a few strongly 
worded reversals would not obviate the problem) applies equally when 
the case was settled by private agreement. 
B. Judicial Integrity 
The judicial integrity argument is also unpersuasive. To be sure, 
161. Laycock, supra note 3, at 119-20. 
162. Id. at 120. 
163. Professor Laycock adds that a consent decree will complicate the remedial process if 
third parties bring a successful claim. Id. That objection is answered supra in Part IV.B. 
164. See supra Part I. 
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the court has an interest in ensuring that it does not tie itself up ad-
ministering an agreement that threatens its institutional integrity.165 
For this reason, the court can and should refuse to enter a consent 
decree that is illegal or of dubious legality on its face. 166 Beyond that, 
it is doubtful that enforcement of a consent decree poses any threat to 
the court's institutional integrity, particularly if the third party can 
bring an action to protect its legal rights. 
C. Utilitarian Gains 
This leaves the argument that by involving affected third parties in 
the consent decree process, fairness hearings produce net social bene-
fits and a better quality_ of justice.167 The notion that adding voices 
improves the quality of the adjudicatory process is generally accepted 
today, 168 and this assumption has led most courts and commentators 
to embrace fairness hearings without more. 
The way the story is usually told, 169 adjudication used to be de-
voted to the resolution of simple disputes; lawsuits were bipolar, pri-
vate and uncomplicated, and the results affected only the parties 
before the court. This "private law" litigation naturally gave rise to a 
procedural system that treated each case as an isolated and independ-
ent controversy. Today, adjudication is different. Today, lawsuits are 
multipolar and complex, often requiring the court to restructure and 
oversee public institutions that affect enormous numbers of people. 
This "public law" litigation requires a fundamentally different ap-
proach to procedure - one that anticipates and takes into account the 
"polycentric" effects of a case. This can only be done properly by 
ensuring a broader representation of interests before the court. . The 
fairness hearing for consent decrees is a product of this new approach. 
It is not true, however, that traditional adjudication was limited to 
isolated bipolar disputes without broader implications.17° Then, as 
now, there were lawsuits with significant effects on public policy and 
165. See supra notes 44-45. 
166. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S. 348, 350 (1965) (per curiam) 
(Harlan, Stewart, Goldberg, JJ., dissenting); Kasper v. Board of Election Commrs., 814 F.2d 
332, 341-42 (7th Cir. 1987). 
167. Note that this argument does not explain why third-party participation is not also re-
quired in the making of contracts generally. 
168. See e.g., Fiss, supra note 2; Weinstein, Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Behavior 
and Institutions-Some Views on Participation, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 231 (1979-1980); Diver, 
supra note 34; Chayes, supra note 2. 
169. The most well-known accounts are by Owen Fiss and Abraham Chayes. See supra note 
168. 
170. See Eisenberg & y eazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980). 
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important consequences for public institutions.171 Moreover, there is 
every reason to believe that the lawyers and judges of the time per-
ceived the implications of these lawsuits. 
The real difference between traditional "private law" adjudication 
and modem "public law" adjudication is less in the implications and 
effects of litigation than in the way courts address these implications 
and effects. 172 Traditional adjudication assumes that the best results 
are reached by fragmenting disputes into one-on-one or a-few-on-a-few 
controversies, carefully preserving the rights of affected third parties 
to bring their own lawsuits later. 173 Accordingly, traditional adjudica-
tion is characterized by very narrow provisions for joinder and inter-
vention and very strict rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
Modem adjudication, by contrast, presumes that better results are 
reached by resolving the disputes of many parties simultaneously. 
Hence, modem procedure permits, and often requires, broad joinder 
of claims and parties; makes intervention easy; and utilizes broad prin-
ciples of claim and issue preclusion. The goal is to enable the court to 
take account of and settle the claims of all affected parties in a single 
proceeding. 
Once we recognize that the choice between a public law and a pri-
vate law model of procedure is to a large extent a choice between two 
different ways to adjudicate a dispute that affects many parties, we 
may question the assumption that "more" (more parties, more evi-
dence, more remedies, more representation) is necessarily "better." 
To be sure, the practical effects of a lawsuit sometimes are such that 
the ability to bring a later action is inadequate to protect all affected 
parties. In many cases it is both fairer and more efficacious to all con-
171. Drawing only on well-known constitutional cases, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304 (1816), and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810), had significant 
"polycentric" effects on large numbers of land owners. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819), Ex Parle Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960), had important consequences for public institutions. Indeed, a number of studies have 
demonstrated the existence of complex controversies prior to the twentieth century. See, e.g., 
Oevlin, Jury Tn'al of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 
CoLUM. L. REv. 43 (1980); Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial b;y Jury in Com-
plex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980); Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (1984). The dispute has been 
over whether these cases were heard by chancery or common law courts. 
172. This is not to deny that there have been changes in the substantive nature of litigation. 
Courts today adjudicate claims that would have been unheard of a century ago. But these devel-
opments are not unrelated to the changes in procedural law. New procedures facilitate the devel-
opment of new substantive claims by making it possible to bring novel lawsuits. This, in turn, 
creates pressure to develop still new procedures to accommodate these new substantive claims 
better, and so on. It is probably not possible to separate cause and effect here. 
173. See Comment, supra note 171, at 606-08 (arguing that there were no complex cases in 
the common Jaw courts because the procedures in these courts were designed either to break 
those cases up into smaller disputes or to shift them to the equity courts). 
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cemed to treat matters comprehensively in one proceeding rather than 
in a series of smaller, related adjudications. But there may be times 
when it is better to decide the smaller chunk while carefully preserving 
the rights of other parties to bring a later action than it is to try and 
accommodate all affected interests in one proceeding. 
The fairness hearing in consent decree cases may be an instance 
where making a proceeding larger does not produce a better quality of 
justice. The argument for fairness hearings depends on a number of 
assumptions, none of which has been tested empirically because they 
have not been recognized by courts and commentators. First, how 
often will the agreement reached by the parties treat third parties 
fairly without judicial interference? Are there many cases in which, 
even if the parties could have been more generous to third parties, the 
difference is not important enough to disturb affected third parties? 
Second, how many settlements that would have been successfully com-
pleted will be prevented if courts J.·aise third-party issues sua sponte or 
insist that third parties be joined? Might we create adversaries and 
antagonism that would not otherwise- exist?174 Third, in addition to 
lost settlement opportunities, how significant are the costs of fairness 
hearings in terms of time, expense and complication associated with 
third-party participation?175 Finally, how great are the benefits to 
third parties from judicial oversight? How often will court-ordered 
changes in a settlement actually be detrimental because the court 
makes a mistake? 
It is hard to answer these questions with confidence. But I suspect 
that the costs of fairness hearings exceed their benefits, particularly 
once third-party rights to challenge consent decrees have been clari-
fied. The right to challenge the decree will protect third parties from 
the worst abuses. More importantly, once the parties understand that 
174. Participating in an adversarial procedure itself creates adversariness. Consider, for ex-
ample, Curtis Berger's account of the remedial stages of a school desegregation case in Berger, 
Away from the Courthouse and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 707 (1978). Berger describes how he succeeded through informal negotiations with all the 
interested parties in formulating a plan that everyone seemed willing to accept. The plan was 
submitted to the court, and a hearing was scheduled. In several fascinating pages, Berger de-
scribes "the excitement, the tension, [and] the rivalry that accompanies a trial"; how "the atmos-
phere felt charged, even though I was su,rrounded by individuals with whom-for the most 
part-I had worked quite comfortably over several months"; and how "stunned" he felt when all 
parties on every side objected to the plan. Id. at 731-33. People in this country are taught that 
the judicial system requires each side to present the most extreme version of its case to a neutral 
arbiter who will sift these versions for the truth. Human nature being what it is, people tend to 
persuade themselves of the positions they advocate. As a result, simply invoking the adversarial 
system creates tensions. 
175. In addition to the expense of preparing for whatever hearings the court holds, the liberal 
discovery permitted by the federal rules is likely to generate enormous costs - particularly in 
multiparty disputes as everyone begins seeking discovery from everyone else. 
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third parties can attack and upset a consent decree, they will also see 
that it is in their interest to anticipate and account for third-party in-
terests ex ante. Thus, the costs of fairness hearings may be great while 
they probably produce only marginal benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
There is nothing mysterious about consent decrees. They are sim-
ply one more way courts can facilitate settlement. There is no judicial 
stake in consent decrees beyond this, and no need to give consent de-
crees any special force or treatment except as necessary to serve this 
goal. Entry of a consent decree should no more affect the rights of a 
third party than settlement by ordinary contract. To the extent that 
special treatment is required, it is only that necessary to protect the 
procedural interests of the court in avoiding duplication of effort and 
conflicting injunctions. These problems can be avoided by channelling 
third-party challenges to the validity of a consent decree to the court 
that entered the decree. Presently, this is done with the collateral at-
tack bar, which requires third parties to intervene in consent decree 
proceedings. Although commentators who argue that this doctrine is 
unconstitutional overstate their case, the collateral attack bar should 
be abandoned since a simpler solution of transfer and consolidation 
adequately protects these judicial interests. Once before the court, 
third parties should be allowed to make the same claims they could 
have made if an independent lawsuit were allowed. But no more than 
this is necessary. Third parties should not be able to force adjudica-
tion of the claim settled by the consent decree, and there is no reason 
to require a fairness hearing before entering the decree. 
